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D I S K U S S I O N 
Die Frage nach einer angemessenen Terminologie zur Analyse der politischen 
Systeme und Entwicklungen in den kommunistisch regierten Staaten Osteuropas hat 
wiederholt in der Fachliteratur Diskussionen hervorgerufen. Der umstrittene Begriff 
„Totalitarismus" kann hier als das bestbekannte Beispiel für solche Auseinander-
setzungen stehen. Doch zeigten gerade die diesen umfassenden Begriff begleitenden 
Diskussionen, wie sehr eine jede allgemeine Bezeichnung der gegenwärtigen osteuro-
päischen Systeme von der analytischen Begrifflichkeit im Detail abhängig ist. Verwen-
det man die in Analysen der freiheitlich demokratischen Systeme üblichen Bezeichnun-
gen einzelner Institutionen und Prozesse, etwa wenn man die „Parlamente" der kom-
munistisch regierten Staaten mit „Parlamenten" im üblichen Sinne des Wortes gleich-
zusetzen sucht, tritt häufig entweder eine unangemessene Verharmlosung oder aber 
eine realitätsfremde Denunziation der grundlegenden Unterschiede in der Wirklich-
keit beider politischer Systeme auf; sucht man die kommunistischen Systeme mit einer 
neuen, system-immanenten Begrifflichkeit zu erfassen, begibt man sich in die Gefahr 
der Verwässerung universaler politischer Wertvorstellungen. 
Im Bestreben, zur Fortentwicklung einer wissenschaftlich fundierten und den 
gegenwärtigen Ansprüchen angemessenen Terminologie für die historische, sozial- und 
politikwissenschaftliche Analyse der osteuropäischen Systeme beizutragen, eröffnet die 
Zeitschrift Bohemia eine Diskussion zu diesem Thema. Dabei sollen begründete, 
durchaus auch subjektive und nicht immer von der Redaktion geteilte Meinungen zur 
Sprache kommen. 
C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A : D I S S E N T A N D R E F O R M 
By Vladimir V. Kusin 
The Prague Spring was a case of dissent and reform coalescing. Against the "Gorba-
chevian" backdrop of a Soviet reform set on becoming government policy in a manner 
reminiscent of Prague in 1968, the evolving relationship between dissidence and 
reformism in Czechoslovakia merits a close look if one is to judge similar processes 
throughout Eastern Europe. 
Rapprochement betweenproponents of change inside and outside a country's estab-
lishment is important because it adds new logic to the reforms and positive orientation 
to the Opposition. This tentative alliance is anathema to the conservative factions. It is 
usually pursued gingerly by the official reformers, who know that it threatens to push 
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their plans beyond the point at which implementation can still be safely controlled. 
However, it is generally welcomed by the dissidents and the radical reform faction. 
Some Definitions 
Reform is understood here to represent an effort on the part of important sections 
of the establishment to effect a transition from centralist to market-related economic 
control, with the parallel relaxation of political, cultural and ideological constraints, 
none of which is intended to change the essential parameters of one-party rule. 
Reform is a spectrum in content and a sequence in time. It is varied in depth, and it 
unfolds gradually. It is malleable in that it can be extended or contracted, speeded up 
or slowed down. 
Dissent is understood here to represent a continuum of attitudes and actions where-
by official postulates are challenged and alternatives proposed and/or pursued. Dis-
sent introduces strife into politics where the rulers would rather have none. Histori-
cally, dissent in communist states has been seen as an anti-system phenomenon, but 
account must be taken of dissention within the establishment. 
A scale of anti-regime attitudes and actions has five levels, in ascending order: 
disaffection; protest; dissent; political Opposition (in the sense of an endeavour to take 
over power from the incumbents by political means); and uprising. Each higher level 
includes manifestations pertaining to all lower levels. 
Dissent expresses either partial challenge to individual policies or overall challenge 
to the systém, or both. Dissent waxes and wanes in terms of its aims, pungency and 
number of proponents. Dissent can be predominantly responsi ve to action initiated by 
the government or predominantly assertive in that it offers its own agenda. 
History of Reform-Dissent Interaction in Czechoslovakia 
There have been seven stages of reform-dissent interaction since the communist 
takeoverin 1948: 
(1) From 1948 to 1956. 
There was no reform in this period and hence no interaction. Dissent was largely 
systemic (integral) and defensive. The new regime prevailed over it by application of 
sheer force. The capacity of dissenters to articulate and diffuse their attitudes among 
the public was lost. Dissenters did not even consider the concept of reform generally, 
feeling that the only way change could be brought about was in the aftermath of an 
East-West confrontation. 
(2) From 1956 to 1967. 
The notion of reformist gradualism surfaced at the start of this period and the gene-
rál public, including most of the dissidents, eventually accepted it as feasible. 
Embryonic reformist views were voicedintheparty priorto and during the twentieth 
congress of theCPSU but were rather successfully quelled by the leadership. Reformist 
thinking then evolved through two phases: a hesitant economic "mini-reform" 
in 1958 and a better thought-out attempt between 1965 and 1967 which included 
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market-related principles; therelaxation of coercive rule, the release of political prison-
ers, and rehabilitation of some victims of Stalinist terror; intellectual emancipation of 
scholarship, culture and the arts; and the growing recognition that Slovák national 
grievances would have to be met by changes in the concept of a unitary statě. The first 
calls for political reform to accompany economic change were made towards the end 
of this period. 
The crystallization of reformist convictions among some party members for a long 
time had the nature of dissent inside the establishment. To believe that the party 
should start reforming the systém meant dissenting from this party's leadership until, 
gradually, the pressure for reform pervaded the decision-making agencies in the party -
state continuum. The gestation of reformism as dissent within the establishment was 
Czechoslovakia's strong point. The leadership was givingway gradually and in a piece-
meal fashion; it only became ready in 1968 for an overall reform programme after it 
had changed itself. 
Outside the establishment the various elements of dissent took heart from intra-
party developments. In addition to "integral" (that is, inimical to the systém) dissi­
dents, who largely remained skeptical but not unreceptive to the budding reformist 
mood and the freer climate for articulation of unorthodox views, there came into exi­
stence a large group of people who supported reform, but were either too young to 
count as members of the establishment or had been ousted from the establishment ear-
lier for a variety of reasons. Even many party members who did not hold power -
those outside or on the fringes of the nomenklatura and those active in the cultural 
field - sided with the reformist constituency because their commitment to intellectual 
values conflicted with the diehard forms of governing practised by the leadership. 
Above all, the psychology of the population at large was decidedly friendly to refor­
mist change, feeding as it did on advances in cultural liberalization and the joint forces 
of dissent and reform. 
(3) The Prague Spring. 
When reformism gained the upper hand in the party leadership it ceased being dis­
sent. A shift in roles occured. In an ideal world, the Prague Spring would have been a 
period without dissent, its mission having been accomplished. Not so in the world of 
reality. Having become policy, reform spawned its own dissent both at the conserva-
tive and the radical ends of the spectrum. Moreover, in turning reformist, the CPCS 
became a dissenter vis-ä-vis the other Communist parties in Eastern Europe. 
Anti-reform dissent was born, all of it inside the communist establishment. Al­
though in considerable dissarray because of the novelty of their predicament, and in-
creasingly orientated towards a Soviet lifeline, the advocates of the status quo ante 
fostered domestic political strif e and kept alive a policy alternative throughout the Pra­
gue Spring. They also succeeded in conserving a cadre base for post-reformist politics 
around which the less consistent reformers could later rally for the pursuance of "nor­
malization". Dismissed by many observers as weak and inexorably dwindling, the 
conservative dissent in fact turned out to be successful, even though it needed outside 
help. 
The radicals, while endorsing the reformist mainstream, dissented (to varying 
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degrees) from the proposed scope and speed of change. Reformist radicalism was 
essentially dissent within the systém embracing people both in and outside the new 
establishment. Like the conservative dissenters, the radicals introduced strife into 
practical politics and into the articulation of reformist objectives. 
Thanks to the large measure of acknowledgement given in the 1960s to the idea of 
gradualist change, there was little integral anti-system dissent in 1968. Opponents of 
communism largely accepted the reformist way as their own and generally sided with 
the radical wing of the reformist constituency. They did not, however, see the reform 
movement as ending with the attainment of an improved, more efficient and humane 
socialism, but rather as a continuous process whose logic would take it beyond the 
systemic boundaries. 
Three tendencies were thus at play and at odds with each other, as is usual in politi-
cal movements concerned with change: advocates of the old tenets of governance; pro-
ponents of controlled reforms with limited objectives inside the systém; and a constit-
uency of "radicals" who wished to develop a reformist progression towards parlia-
mentary democracy. 
In 1968, reform became established, begot its own dissent, and advanced towards 
its own demise at the hands of an external suzerain from which it dissented. 
(4) From April 1969 to the Summer ofl972. 
Whereas the changing of roles in the process of interaction between official policy, 
reform and dissent in the 1960s came about gradually, with the January 1968 water-
shed only confirming earlier developments, the reversal was much more abrupt. The 
interlude during which reformism withered as official policy lasted from the Warsaw 
Pact invasion in August 1968 to the institution of Gustav Husák as party leader in 
April 1969. From then on, counter-reform was to be the leading principle of govern-
ment for seventeen years, until the seifsame Husák leadership contrived to adopt 
"Gorbachevian" precepts in the late autumn of 1986. 
In addition to the most momentous change - banishment of reform from govern-
ment - three developments of note characterized the initial stage of "normalization": 
a disintegration of the reformist coalition of 1968; a belief that reform of the Prague 
Spring type was the only possible goal-orientation for newly emerging dissent; and a 
sharp dechne of the public's readiness to partieipate in either government or dissent. 
Under the pressure of sharply changed circumstances and of vicious intimidation, a 
part of the mainstream reformers of 1968 turned their coats and joined the new conser-
vative coalition. Others, together with their more radical colleagues, were briskly 
removed from positions of authority. The rapid break-up of the reforming govern-
ment testifies both to the overwhelming influence which the Soviet Union exercised 
over Czechoslovakia even after eight months of reformist rule and to the tenuous level 
of cohesiveness which the change-seeking constituency had been capable of attaining 
when it held power. 
With almost half-a-million reformers shunted aside and with the public demonstrat-
ing its identification with the Prague Spring, it seemed logical for an attempt to be un-
dertaken to constitute an oppositional group - dissent - based on Prague Spring tenets 
and led by exeommunicated party members. The attempt faltered on the new regime's 
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coercive activities as much as on the refusal of the population, including many Prague 
Spring enthusiasts, to take part. 
Reformist dissent ceased to be attractive or feasible. Most of "dissent" became 
simple "disaffection"; some of it latent because repression made articulation close to 
impossible. 
(5) From 1972 to 1976. 
During this period dissent reconstituted itself due to a small number of intellectuals 
(mainly writers and scholars) and redefined its parameters. Intellectual freedom rather 
than reform of communísm on Prague Spring Unes became the quiding principle of the 
newly emerging dissent. A means of articulation was re-established in the form of 
samisdat and open correspondence with friendly Western intellectuals. 
Both reform and intellectual freedom having been removed from the establishment, 
they coalesced outside it. Many ex-reformers discovered the value of intellectual and 
spirituál continuity with the pre-communist past and the contemporary non-commu-
nist world. Dissent became less communist-oriented and more imbued with liberal 
democratic values. As understood in dissident circles, reform acquired a moral dimen-
sion that extended further than repair of communist defects. The role of the individual 
in society - vis-á-vis the statě and in regard to other individuals - came into focus as a 
concern which many now regard as more important than adjustment of economic 
mechanisms. The mission of cultural and national heritage began to be seen in clearer 
contours, as it had often been in earlier periods which tested the Czech and Slovák 
nations' capacity for endurance. Ideological differences within the dissident commu­
nity lost much if not all of their relevance. 
(6) From 1977 to 1985. 
The "humanization" of reform and the "liberalization" of dissent continued as 
Charter 77 constituted itself at the beginning of 1977 to provide a common denomina-
tor and arallyingpoint. Soon afterwards the spirituál void of "really existing socialism" 
began being challenged by a religious revival which itself had been influenced by the 
election of a Polish pope and by the role played by the Polish Catholic Church prior 
to and during the Solidarity era. A youth subculture came to embrace a growing num­
ber of people and an increasing variety of activities. A cultural renaissance among non-
rcgime intellectuals flourished as an entire spectrum oí samisdat publications, books 
and periodicals were written and disseminated. A certain measure of coalescing of 
views, though not a seamless merger, began to develop, particularly in the common 
appreciation of the adverse environment to which all the Strands of dissent were 
exposed. 
The reform faction among the dissidents continued to exist but was no longer domi­
nant. Moreover, there was little if any reformism in the establishment with which 
kinship could be sought. The generál psychology of the last stage of "Brezhnevism" 
was not encouraging in this respect. The rise and fall of Solidarity in Poland projected 
itself into Czechoslovakia as a reinforcement of the generál sense of futility: firstly, 
because the Czechoslovak working class was generally seen as unable to imitate the 
Polish example, and secondly, because martial law demonstrated how much coercive 
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strength still existed in a systém otherwise considered to be stagnant and fumbling. 
The pragmatism of a leadership faction of the Communist party (Lubomír Strougal, 
Leopold Lér) at the beginning of the 1980s, which emerged as a result of economic 
dechne rather than a reorientation of priorities on the value scale of the party, aroused 
interest but no sense of identification among the dissidents. Similarly, the Andropov 
incumbency gave rise to embryonic expectations but to no feeling of kinship. The ele-
vation of Chernenko confirmed what had been crystallizing as a general-consensus 
among the dissidents, námely that reform was not the order of the day and that the 
thrust of dissent must lie in the direction of their self-defence and survival. 
(7) From 1986 to the Present. 
The advent of truly reformist "Gorbachevism" in 1986, following the initial stage of 
campaigns for disciplině, against vodka and against corruption, marked an important 
change: the issue of reform suddenly re-emerged as a viable and immediate prospect, 
and dissent was rather quickly able to go from def ence to positive assertion of its desid-
erata. The relationship between dissent and reform has acquired a meaning once again. 
Interaction began. 
The hitherto largely united Czechoslovak establishment became divided between 
an efficiency-orientated reform faction and a conservative majority. The conflict was 
eventually absorbed (but not quite dissipated) into the context of a policy of "conser­
vative reformism" which the leadership devised as its response to Gorbachev. The 
pursuance of reform by the conservatives has all the appearances of a precarious and 
temporary Solution but, for the time being, it enjoys Moscow's approval as the policy 
which disturbs political tranquility least. 
The importance of "reform" inside the present Czechoslovak regime lies less in 
actual change than in the existence of an imperative to which a response can be delayed 
and diluted but not avoided. It will always threaten to outgrow the restrictions impos­
ed on its scope and pace by the present iiicumbents. Reform is the Prague leadership's 
sword of Damocles. 
Unlike in 1968, there are now reforms outside Czechoslovakia - in Hungary, 
Poland and the Soviet Union itself - which have become terms of reference that cannot 
be ignored. The external pressure on Czechoslovakia is reformist now, whereas it was 
counter-reformist in 1968. The Prague Spring itself is a part of this pressure, a legend 
that threatens to become reality and a criterion from history by which attitudes to the 
future are measured. 
Dissent has begun to interact with this composite concept of reform in several ways. 
The movement has grown perceptibly stronger in numbers and in its capability to 
commune with the generál public. Once again, it offers for consideration a set of desid-
erata which do not look fictive and accepts as feasible the notion that the established 
policies can gradually change. Dissent has emerged from the long non-reform period 
intellectually enriched. It is much less orientated towards contentment with repairs to 
the systém and is much more cognizant of the human and national dimensions of 
change-seeking. It accepts the non-communist (democratic, religious) goal orien-
tations as legitimate and indispensible components of its own existence. This matura-
tion of dissent makes, on the one hand, interaction with reforms inside the establish-
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ment more difficult while, on the other hand, it enhances the pressure for genuine 
change. There is also ambivalence in the attitude of Czechoslovak dissent towards 
Gorbachev. While the discovery of the reformist way by Moscow is generally wel-
comed, not least because of the change that it can perhaps bring about in Czechoslova­
kia, many dissidents dislike being the recipients of favöurs when Moscow is dispen-
sing them. 
At the same time, "Gorbachevism" has invigorated the "hard core" of Czechoslo­
vak ref orm-communist dissent, those of the Prague Spring protagonists who maintain-
ed their communist convictions in the process of de-ideologization during the 1970's 
and early 1980s. Alexander Dubček is the prime example; in an interview with 1'Unita 
in January 1988, he called for "party reconciliation" by way of readmission of those 
purged, and for a new party program along the Unes of the Prague Spring. The idea 
that twenty years of non-reform can be forgotten, as if they did not exist, finds little 
understanding in most of the dissident community. It is also an unrealistic idea; major 
reversals tend to engender recrimination and retribution. Even less attractive is the 
notion of the reformers of yesterday embracing the self-proclaimed "reformers" of 
today. To raise dissent into the establishment is not that easy. 
In the last instance, cross-fertilization between official reformism and dissent can 
only begin after genuine reform asserts itself. For the time being, dissent interacts with 
reform as an idea, not with a tangible reformist dedication. 
Conclusion 
Interaction between reform and dissent creates an auspicious Situation in the sense 
that it endows the process of change with the much needed populär underpinning 
while, at the same time, lessening political strife. Czechoslovakia went through such a 
process in the 1960s and may be at the beginning of a similar rapprochement now. 
Nonetheless, the intervening twenty years have made a simple resumption of the pro­
cess difficult. Prerequisites will first have to be created, virtually all of them in the estab-
lishment. Not only is there a lack of political will for genuine change among the in-
cumbents of today, but the quality of societal management has deteriorated and popu­
lär skepticism is more rampant than during the 1960s. Much of the Czech and Slovák 
dissent has focussed on values that go beyond mere tinkering with the systém. There is 
strong interest in the non-economic aspects of "Gorbachevism": democratization and 
intellectual freedom. Even if true perestroika were to be accepted by the establishment 
to the point of becoming credible policy, the willingness of the new reformist leader­
ship to accept the democratic values which have prevailed in dissident community 
orientation would be doubtful. Conversely, a large part of the dissident community 
will continue to distrust the government and press for more than is offered. 
